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Complexity and Aggregation in Choice
of Law:
An Introduction to the Landscape
Louise Ellen Teitz*

Many of us who have taught Civil Procedure lecture our
students about the "building blocks" of putting lawsuits together,
emphasizing the stated goal I of efficiency through joinder of
claims and parties. Yet we generally fail to mention to the already
2
bewildered first year student that the resulting complex
structure will likely have an impact on the substantive law that
will be applied. 3 We extol the virtues of consolidation of claims
and parties, the zenith of which is the class action, even while
courts continue to refuse to certify classes because of the fear of
confusion and lack of manageability. It is only when these same
students return to us as third year students in Conflict of Laws
* Louise Ellen Teitz, Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of
Law, Bristol, Rhode Island and Chair, AALS Section of Conflict of Laws 20072008. Jessica Grimes, Class of 2010, provided invaluable research assistance.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("Scope and Purpose. These rules govern the
procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district
courts, except as stated in Rule 81.
They should be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.").
2. As used in the Complex Litigation Project, "'complex litigation' refers
exclusively to multiparty, multiforum litigation; it is characterized by related
claims dispersed in several forums and often involving events that occurred
over long periods of time." AM. LAw INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS, 7 (1994).
3. Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Choice of Law, 14 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 12 (2009).
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that we reveal the complete picture, that joining parties and
claims may, and usually does, affect the underlying substantive
law, either directly 4 or indirectly through the choice of law rules
employed. 5 While startling to our students, this admission is
neither new nor surprising to scholars, practitioners, and judges
who have grappled with the issue for decades.
Indeed, there have been attempts on many fronts- in the
courts, in Congress, and among scholars- to resolve the tension
between aggregation and choice of law. Many of these attempts
have arisen from the structural side, focusing on choice of law only
as it creates a barrier to procedural joinder. Thus the goal has
been to simplify choice of law so that aggregation, especially class
actions, can occur. Yet one is tempted to suggest that we may be
asking the wrong question, that our starting point needs
redefining. Should we have choice of law rules for substantive
claims which can be applied easily, 6 even when we have multiple
parties? And can we agree on underlying assumptions, such as
that one person injured by a product or involved in a mass tort or
taken in by a ponzi scheme should get the same result as another?
Or as another from the same state or country? Even here, we do
not all begin with the same notion of what is conflicts "equality,"
although we generally may share a common precept that
procedure should not control substance.
Because choice of law is part of the process of defining the
parties' rights, it should not change simply because, as a matter of
administrative convenience and efficiency, we have combined
many claims in one proceeding; whatever choice-of-law rules we
use to define substantive rights should be the same for ordinary

4. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762
(E.D.N.Y. 1980)(Weinstein creates common law tort liability).
5. See, e.g., In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd,
407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005).
6. Dean Symeon Symeonides has attempted to formulate choice of law
rules through extensive study of the existing cases for product liability, an
area of substantive law that underlies a significant portion of aggregate and
complex litigation. See Symeon Symeonides, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW
REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS: TODAY AND TOMORROW, 298 RECUEIL DES COURS 1

(Hague Academy of International Law 2003). His study largely excluded
class actions. Thus it is not at all clear that these rules would be viable in
mass torts and aggregate litigation without some adjustments. See id. at 279,
n. 1081.
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and complex cases.
While most of us as Conflicts scholars would agree with the
basic proposition, how we reach that result is subject to
considerable disagreement.
This Symposium volume grows out of the 2008 Annual
Program of the Conflict of Laws Section of the Association of
American Law Schools. 8 Since much of the recent attention on
the Class Action Fairness Act 9 and aggregate litigation has
focused on the procedural and structural problems first, and on
choice of law, if at all, second, the panel was charged with
examining the problems of choice of law in aggregate, complex,
and mass tort litigation. The presenters were to consider the
issues raised for choice of law and the recent attempts to resolve
these in legislation, in ALI projects, and in court cases. To this
end, the panel included a proceduralist and rule drafter, a
practitioner, a Conflicts scholar, and a sitting federal District
Court Judge. 10
As mentioned above, much of the recent scholarship and
attention by practitioners has centered on the procedural aspect of
aggregation, for example the impact on the class action procedure
of claims that involve diverse and multiple substantive laws.
From the plaintiffs vantage, is there a way to circumvent this
problem and still manage to be certified, usually as a (b)(3) class
action?' 1 Can subclasses be used? Courts have been grappling
7.

Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N. Y. U. L.

REV. 547, 547 (1996).

8. The program, Choice of Law in Aggregate, Complex, and Mass Tort
Litigation: Accommodating Policy, Procedure, and Practicality, was presented
in Washington, DC while I was serving as Chair of the Section.
9. Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2005).
10. The original panel included Judge Shira Scheindlin of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York who added the
essential viewpoint from the bench of the practical difficulties and realities
that the trial judge must face in these cases. I am indebted to her for her
major contribution to the panel and regret that this element is not included
in this Symposium. Professor Nancy J. Moore was not a participant on the
panel but graciously agreed to contribute to the Symposium volume,
providing the perspective of a scholar and expert on professional
responsibility, raising the largely overlooked issues of choice of law in
professional responsibility. Professor Moore was the Chief Reporter for the
ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Ethics
2000"), the major ABA revision of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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with these issues, some more successfully than others,1 2 certainly
since Rule 23 was amended in 1966, if not before.
There have been numerous attempts since 1938 to consolidate
and aggregate cases where possible, to make litigation more
efficient and less costly to the participants and the system.
Examples are legion. Rule 23, as revised in 1966, provided for
three categories of class actions, the most problematic in terms of
multiple underlying substantive laws, being the (b)(3) or damage
class. The potential for large damage class actions was not
necessarily foreseen, especially in the mass accident tort context;
the Advisory Committee notes even suggested that mass torts
might not be appropriate for class treatment. 13 However, one
would not expect necessarily to see any discussion of choice of law
in keeping with the concept that Federal Rules make procedural
changes but can't modify substantive rights. 14 Also of significance
in aggregating cases is the multidistrict transfer statute, Section
140715, added in 1968, which provides a process for consolidation
12. Linda J. Silberman, Choice of Law in National Class Actions: Should
CAFA Make a Difference?, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 54 (2009); Elizabeth
J. Cabraser, Just Choose: The JurisprudentialNecessity to Select a Single
Governing Law for Mass Claims Arising from Nationally Marketed Consumer
Goods and Services, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 29 (2009).
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note. A "mass accident"
resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a
class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of
damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting
the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted
nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple
lawsuits separately tried.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990) provides: "Such rules shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules
shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect."
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976) provides:
(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be
made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this
section upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for
the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and
Each action so transferred shall be
efficient conduct of such actions.
remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial
proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have
been previously terminated: Provided, however, that the panel may separate
any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand any of
such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded.
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within the federal courts of cases "involving common questions of
fact" into one district for pretrial purposes only. 16 Unlike the
class action procedure and subsequent revisions to it, only pretrial
issues are resolved in theory, 17 although often the parties agree to
litigate the merits at the same place, or more frequently, the cases
settles before trial.
Another recent statutory enactment is the Mutiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction Act' 8 which was added as Section 1369 to
expand federal court jurisdiction to allow consolidation of actions
involving certain mass torts into one lawsuit in one district,
without concern with the difficulties of current federal diversity of
citizenship interpretations requiring complete diversity and
disallowing aggregation of claims for monetary jurisdictional
purposes. The statute, enacted in 2002, vests federal district
courts with original jurisdiction for litigation arising from a single
accident where at least 75 persons die. An earlier version of the
statute, as introduced in the House of Representatives in 1999 as
H.R. 2112,19 actually attempted to add a choice of law rule for the
court, 20 listing factors such as place of injury, place of conduct,
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2002).
H.R. 2112, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999).

20.

H.R. 2112 provided:

e) CHOICE OF LAW- (1) DETERMINATION BY THE COURTChapter 111 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end the following new section:
Sec. 1660. Choice of law in multiparty, multiforum actions
(a) FACTORS- In an action which is or could have been brought,
in whole or in part, under section 1369 of this title, the district
court in which the action is brought or to which it is removed
shall determine the source of the applicable substantive law,
except that if an action is transferred to another district court,
the transferee court shall determine the source of the applicable
substantive law. In making this determination, a district court
shall not be bound by the choice of law rules of any State, and
the factors that the court may consider in choosing the
applicable law include-(1) the place of the injury;
(2) the place of the conduct causing the injury;
(3) the principal places of business or domiciles of the
parties;
(4) the danger of creating unnecessary incentives for forum

6
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domicile of the parties- factors also found in an earlier ALI
Complex Litigation Project 21- but adding concerns with forum
shopping and foreseeability. These provisions, which were to be
Section 1660, did not make it to the final mass tort statute of
2002.
Another statutory effort to aggregate cases can be seen in the
recently enacted Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, CAFA, which
provides federal court jurisdiction, both original and removal, for
nationwide class actions with only minimal diversity where the
total amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.22 While there
was an attempt to include choice of law rules 23 , the final
legislation removed these rules, like Section 1369, and created
more aggregation in federal courts, without resolving the conflict
of laws issue. Thus, while the federal courts have been faced with
complex and aggregated cases, through procedural mechanisms
that are increasingly moving these lawsuits from state to federal
court, they have been provided little assistance on how to resolve
the continual choice of law problems that loom in every issue.
Many will argue that Congress missed the opportunity to create
order from chaos in the most recent legislation in the area,
CAFA. 24 The burden continues to fall on trial court judges, who
make valiant efforts to create some workable rule, often only to be
25
reversed by appellate courts removed from the practical battles.
The judges are not alone in grappling with the issue of choice
of law in these complex cases. The American Law Institute has
undertaken twice to address complex litigation. The first project,
shopping; and
(5) whether the choice of law would be reasonably
foreseeable to the parties.
21. AM.

LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS

AND ANALYSIS § 6.01 (1994).

22. For a thorough discussion of CAFA, see Silberman, supra note 13, at
55-58.
23. See Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class
Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001 (2008).

24. Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law:
Choice of Law after the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839,
1867-71 (2006).
25. A well-known example is Judge Barker's particularly detailed
analysis of choice of law in the multistate context, reversed by the Seventh
Circuit. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tire Prod. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D.
503 (S.D. Ind. 2001); rev'd 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. Ind. 2002).
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The Complex Litigation Project, begun in 1986 and finished in
1993, was designed "to develop an understanding of the
phenomenon of multiparty, multiforum lawsuits" and provide
options for "mitigating the problems these cases pose."' 26 That
plan interestingly sought to be consistent with three overriding
concerns: respecting federalism, not adding to the federal court
docket, and not compromising the litigants' fundamental
procedural rights. 27 Chapter 6 actually addressed choice of law,
developing a set of rules for mass tort and mass contract, statutes
of limitations, and monetary and punitive damages.
"This
Chapter proposes the enactment of a coherent and uniform federal
choice of law code for these cases. '2 8 The Reporters continue:
"This Chapter is premised on the conclusions that a federal
statutory choice of law code is necessary to foster the fair and
efficient handling of complex litigation and that, in order to
provide sufficient predictability and avoid conflicting results, it
would be preferable to devise reasonably precise choice of law
rules to be applied in these cases. ' 29 Thus the rules sought to
allow federal courts to reduce the choice of law inquiry at least in
tort into a federal rule which would apply the law of only one
state, "to the extent feasible. " The choice of law chapter was
perhaps the most controversial part of the Complex Litigation
Project, with proponents of rules lining up against those who
would accept a more ad hoc approach. In the end, there is the
proposal for rules- rules that federal courts will use to determine
the underlying substantive law, rules whose goal is to apply only
one choice of law rule.
The second and current ALI project to tackle choice of law in
the complex litigation area
is the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation. 3 0 The
Principles encompass a broader scope than the earlier project,
reaching proceedings "that combine claims or defenses held by
many persons for unified resolution, which may be trial or
26. AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS
AND ANALYSIS, Introduction and Scope 3 (1994).
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 7.
Id. at Chapter 6, Choice of Law Introductory Note 305.
Id. at 305-06.

30.

AM. LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION

(Council Draft No. 2, November 18, 2008).
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settlement. ' 3 1 Unlike the earlier ALI project, at least equal focus
is devoted to settlement as to adjudication. Nor is there any
suggestion of incorporating a national choice of law standard for
aggregate cases; the Principles instead are based on maintaining
the status quo. 32 Section 2.05 on Choice of Law seeks largely to
incorporate existing choice of law through approval of aggregate
treatment in three current situations: when one law applies to all
claims; when different laws are "the same in functional content;"
or when there are a limited number of patterns. 33
The history of the statutory provisions for aggregation and of
Rule 23 reflect efforts to create efficient and fair solutions for
increasingly complex litigation which routinely crosses state
borders and more and more often country boundaries. As the
structures for aggregation increase, problems of choice of law rise
proportionally. What efforts that have made to adopt federal
choice of law rules have failed. The courts have been left to
handle the resulting morass, with more or less success, often
ending in noncertification of a class and dismissal or if not,

subsequent reversal of the class certification. District court judges
have labored long on choice of law decisions, studying various
state laws, trying to determine an appropriate choice of law rule,
often struggling with multiple subclasses.
In the end, the
questions raised involve not only efficiency but whether the choice
31.

AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §

1.02 at cmt. a (Council Draft No. 2, November 18, 2008).
32. Id. "Subsection (a) contemplates no change in what one might call the
court's selection or determination of choice-of-law principles -- that is the
court's identification of the body of choice-of-law principles to govern its
selection of applicable substantive law."
33. Id. at § 2.05. As the Reporters explain:
e. Manageablepatterns. Subsection (b)(3) recognizes that choice-oflaw considerations should not defeat aggregate treatment when the
court determines that a manageable number of patterns exist in the
relevant bodies of substantive law and explains their suitability for
treatment on an aggregate basis as part of its trial plan under § 2.12.
That 50 different states' laws might apply to a set of claims does not
necessarily mean that 50 radically different variations in functional
content exist. Subsection (b)(3) recognizes that different states' laws
can form manageable clusters or groupings, even when they are not
entirely uniform. Common issues may exist within the respective
clusters so as to make aggregate treatment permissible.
Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.05 at
cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008).
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of law for an individual case would lead to a different outcome.
The four articles in this Symposium volume address choice of
law in complex and aggregate litigation from different
perspectives.
Edward Cooper provides the perspective of a
proceduralist who also serves as the Reporter for the United
States Judicial Conference Advisory Commission on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, he served as the Reporter
on the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act (UTLA) 34 which invests
the appropriate court (normally the trial level court) with the dual
authority, first, to transfer litigation to a court in another state (or
a federal court) and, second, to receive litigation transferred to it
from a court in another state (or a federal court). Edward
Cooper's article serves as an introduction to the two essential
issues: whether aggregation should change choice of law and
whether there are choice of law principles that could facilitate
"procedurally desirable aggregation." In his article, he explores
the interests that are involved in shaping choice of law in
aggregated cases. The choice of law problem impedes procedural
advantages that might come with aggregation. But even smallscale aggregation may have inescapable effects on choice of law
which may not be as justified as in large-scale aggregation. After
exploring these problems, Cooper reviews the possible legislative
solutions to choice of law problems, including the creation of
choice of law rules for class actions by Congress. In the end he
emphasizes that the benefits of large-scale aggregation from a
procedural standpoint could justify substantive accommodation
that subordinates individual interests.
Elizabeth Cabraser, one of the top class action litigators in the
country, usually representing plaintiffs, provides the view of the
practitioner who has to deal with these choice of law problems in
her cases, especially those involving goods and services, which
make up a significant category of complex litigation nationally.
Cabraser reviews the all too frequent tendency of many courts to
choose among applicable law, resulting in eventual denial of class
certification because the procedure is too unmanageable. She

34. This Act was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners
of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1991 but has not been adopted in any
state. The Act is available at http://www.nccusl.org (last visited Mar. 4,
2009).
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argues that many courts label variations in state laws as
"conflicts" when that is not necessary; even when the variation is
significant, subclassing can be used. Courts, instead, are often
persuaded by defendants that the law of all plaintiffs must be
applied, amounting to 50 different laws and thus lack of
commonality or manageability. Cabraser implores courts to select
a single governing law for choice of law which may not be perfect
but may be the best, relatively speaking.
Linda Silberman offers the view of an expert in choice of law
(as well as in civil procedure) about class actions, the prototypical
complex case.
Silberman examines national class actions,
especially in the context of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).
After reviewing the importance of forum shopping for choice of
law, Silberman addresses the issue of whether there should be
special choice of law rules for aggregate litigation and suggests
that choice of law should not be subordinated to procedural needs
for certification. Silberman develops the argument supporting a
federal choice of law rule for those class actions brought in or
removed to federal court under CAFA.
Nancy Moore, an expert in professional responsibility and
who was not a participant in the original Conflicts Section
program, provides a view of an often overlooked part of choice of
law-that of professional responsibility. The aggregation of cases
has implications for the ethical responsibilities and duties of
lawyers in these multistate cases. In the past, ethical rules may
have been the same in most jurisdictions, but as the ethical
landscape has become more divergent, the need for making
choices is more significant.
Moore highlights the scope of
professional responsibility issues that provide choice of law
concerns and she focuses on the additional complexities arising
from aggregate litigation, both class and nonclass cases. These
issues range from conflicts of interests to contingent fees and
appear both pre-litigation and during the litigation process.
Moore makes a plea for more conscious recognition of the ethical
issues raised and the resulting choice of law problems posed.
In the end, our authors and their varied perspectives serve to
remind us that choice of law is a crucial element in the creation of
procedural devices that aggregate litigation. All too often it is
swept under the carpet by litigants and legislators, or
manipulated by courts to resolve procedural issues, either
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allowing aggregation or denying it. To many choice of law is the
stumbling block to aggregation, especially in the context of
nationwide class actions, the barrier to procedural efficiency. The
AALS panel and this Symposium volume are designed to reverse
that presumption and to force us to think about what rules choice
of law should use to provide fair and uniform application of law
and what interests we must include in the balance.
This Symposium volume would not be possible without the
support and participation of many. I am indebted first to the
AALS Conflict of Laws Section for allowing me to plan the
program for January 2008; and to the panel participants,
colleagues and friends, who agreed not only to speak but also
agreed to produce an article from their talk. Professor Moore
deserves special mention since she did not even speak and yet
agreed to the venture over lunch between friends.
The program became a Symposium volume only through the
generous support of Roger Williams University School of Law and
specifically, of Dean David Logan, and through the hard work of
the Law Review, especially Jillian Taylor, the Executive Articles
Editor.
Louise Ellen Teitz
Bristol, Rhode Island

